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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the Case: 
This is a land use case involving the payment of impact fees. Appellants Buckskin 
Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively "Buckskin") undertook a multi-
phase development called The Meadows at West Mountain ("The Meadows") located in Valley 
County, Idaho. After paying the impact fee on three out of six phases of the development, 
Buckskin filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the payment of impact fees violated state 
law because Valley County did not follow the requirements of state law for collecting impact 
fees. The district court dismissed Buckskin's Complaint on summary judgment on grounds that 
all of Buckskin's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations for bringing an 
inverse condemnation claim. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings: 
Buckskin filed its initial Complaint against Valley County on December 1, 2009. R. Vol. 
I, p. 1. Buckskin's Complaint included two counts requesting a declaratory judgment that Valley 
County's collection of impact fees is in violation ofIdaho law and for inverse condemnation. Id. 
Valley County answered on December 21,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 9. Valley County filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment on October 14, 2010 arguing that Buckskin's Complaint must be 
dismissed based on the running of the statute of limitations for inverse condemnation claims, 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, ripeness, and allegations that Buckskin's payment of 
the impact fee was voluntary. R. Vol. I, p. 35. Buckskin filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Summary Judgment on November 2,2010. After oral argument on Valley County's 
motion, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment granting summary judgment to Valley County on January 7, 2011. R. Vol. 
III, p. 486. 
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The district court dismissed Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim on the basis that the 
four-year statute of limitation accrued when payment of the impact fee was made on Phase 1 of 
The Meadows, which was more than four years from the filing of Buckskin's Complaint. Jd. 
The district court also held, however, that Valley County acted outside the scope of its legal 
authority to collect an impact fee. Jd. Based on the district court's Memorandum Decision, 
Buckskin filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 10, 2011, seeking a 
declaration from the district court on Count I of the Complaint that Buckskin was not required to 
pay an impact fee. R. Vol. III, p. 494. Valley County filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment on 
January 13,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 498. The following day, on January 14,2011, Buckskin filed 
an opposition to the Motion for Entry of Judgment arguing that the district court's Memorandum 
Decision did not dispose of Buckskin's claim for a declaratory ruling that it did not have to pay 
impact fees for Phases 4,5, and 6 of The Meadows. 
Shortly thereafter Buckskin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration! Amendment and 
supporting memorandum on January 21, 2001. R. Vol. III, p. 513, 515-22. The Motion for 
Reconsideration!Amendment repeated the arguments on Buckskin's opposition to entry of 
judgment, that Buckskin's claim for inverse condemnation on Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows 
was timely because they were separate takings with separate accrual dates, and because the five-
year statute of limitations for disputes arising from a written agreement applies in this case. 
On March 7, 2011, the Valley County Board of County Commissioners adopted 
Resolution 11-6, which purports to place a moratorium on aspects of Valley County's impact fee 
practices. R. Vol. III, p. 55l. Two days after adopting Resolution 11-6, on March 9, 2011, 
Valley County filed its brief replying to Buckskin's objections to the Motion for Entry of 
Judgment, arguing, in part, that Resolution 11-6 mooted Buckskin's objections to the entry of 
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judgment. R. Vol. III, pp. 540, 548, Ex. 1. The district court then conducted a hearing on these 
matters two days later, on March 11,2011. 
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; and (3) Plaintiffs Motion 
to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on April 11, 2011, denying Buckskin's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration! Amendment, and granting the Motion for 
Entry of Judgment and granting, in part, the Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and costs. R. 
Vol. III, p. 577. The District Court entered its Judgment on April 19, 2011, in favor of Valley 
County dismissing all of Buckskin's claims against Valley County with prejudice, and ordering 
Buckskin to pay costs to Valley County in the amount of $666. R. Vol. III, p. 596. Thereafter, 
Buckskin filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court on May 26, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 599. Valley 
County filed Notice of its Cross Appeal on June 15,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 605. 
(iii) Statement of Facts: 
Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"): 
The Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), I.C. § 67-8201 et seq., is the 
enabling statute that sets forth all of the necessary prerequisites for a local government entity to 
collect an impact fee. An impact fee is: "a payment of money imposed as a condition of 
development approval to pay for a proportionate share of the cost of system improvements 
needed to serve development." I.C. § 67-8203(9). The purpose of IDIFA is to promote orderly 
growth and development by establishing uniform procedures for local governments to require 
developers the payment of impact fees and to establish minimum standards for the 
implementation of impact fee ordinances. I.C. § 67-8202. The payment of an impact fee is 
usually established during the land use application process as a "development requirement." 
IDIF A defines "development requirement" as: 
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· .. a requirement attached to a developmental approval or other governmental action 
approving or authorizing a particular development project including, but not limited 
to, a rezoning, which requirement compels the payment, dedication or contribution of 
goods, services, land, or money as a condition of approval. 
LC. § 67-8203(10) (underlining added). 
IDIF A indicates that "Governmental entities which comply with the requirements of this 
chapter may impose by ordinance development impact fees as a condition of development 
approval on all developments." I.C. § 67-8204 (underlining added). Hence, failure to follow 
IDIF A precludes a governmental entity from collecting an impact fee and/or conditioning a land 
use approval upon the payment of an impact fee. 
Valley County's Local Land Use Development Ordinance: 
Valley County's ordinance containing the regulations and standard of review procedures 
for zoning and subdivision applications is called the Valley County Land Use and Development 
Ordinance ("LUDO"). The LUDO contains the rules and procedures for all land use applications 
in Valley County. Appendix C to the 2004 LUDO contains the requirements for Planned Unit 
Development Applications. One of the requirements under the LUDO is the payment of impact 
fees. It states, in relevant part: 
I. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
Because of the uniqueness of each proposal a PUD may impact county services 
and/or property which may be mitigated through a Development Agreement. 
Compensation for these impacts shall be negotiated in work sessions with 
appropriate county entities and a Development Agreement shall be entered into 
between the applicant and the county through the Board as additional conditions 
considered for approval of a PUD. 
J. IMPACT FEES 
The Commission may recommend to the Board impact fees as authorized by 
Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal. The Board may implement the 
impact fees as recommended by the Commission or as it deems necessary for the 
proposal. 
R. Vol. II, p. 298 (emphasis added). 
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Valley County's Capital Improvements Program: 
Valley County has also implemented a program it calls a Capital Improvements Program 
("CIP") for new development in the County. Affidavit of Victor S. Villegas in Support of 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon 
Cruickshank), p. 36, l. 17 - p. 37, 1. 8. 1 Under that program, Valley County identified different 
areas throughout the county to determine the level of road improvements necessary for the roads 
in that area to handle the increases in traffic as a result of the development. fd. Valley County 
identified approximately 15 to 20 CIP areas throughout the County. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A 
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 39, l. 2-11. Under the CIP, road impact fees are to be 
paid pursuant to a contract called a Road Development Agreement ("RDA") between the 
developer and Valley County. Importantly, the CIP is not part of the LUDO and is not an 
ordinance or law. 
A description of Valley County's CIP can be found in the public records such as Valley 
County's March, 2008 Master Transportation Plan. The Transportation Plan describes the CIP 
as: 
E. Capital Improvement Program Process and Purpose 
Valley County has developed and adopted a Capital Improvement Program (CIP). 
The following description of the CIP is provided by Valley County: 
In 2005, the Valley County Commissioners initiated a Road Development 
Agreement (RDA) process to require new developments to pay a fee to 
mitigate the impacts of their developments on the roads and bridges in Valley 
County. The RDA process replaced the Capital Contribution Agreements that 
were used by Valley County for larger developments that needed infrastructure 
improvements. The RDA requires all developers to pay a fee based on the 
number of trips their developments generate. Developers are, in effect, required 
to pay for the roadway capacity their developments use. The fee must be 
paid at the time of final plat. Credit is given for ROW [right-of-way] required 
I The Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was sent to 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as an Exhibit to the Clerk's Record and will be subsequently referred to as the 
"Villegas Affidavit." 
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from the development and any in-lieu-of contributions, such as construction 
materials or developer sponsored construction of portions of roads and bridges. 
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. E (emphasis added). 
The CIP requires that developers pay a fee, construct in-kind improvements on existing 
roadways or dedicate rights-of-way in an amount calculated by the County's engineer to deal 
with impacts on county roads. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at 
p. 41, 1. 7 - p. 42, l. 18. The CIP, and calculations as to road impacts allegedly caused by new 
development, was completed by Valley County and its engineer sometime between 2000 and 
2005. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 43, 1. 6 - p. 45, 1. 11. 
Valley County did not bother to follow IDIF A and the enabling process required under 
IDIFA to exact road impact fees from developers. This is true even though Valley County 
officials understood that they were requiring developers to pay to mitigate the impacts of 
development. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. B (deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 59, 11. 16-24. 
Planning and Zoning officials just assumed that the RDA scheme was lawful under the Local 
Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), which allows for development agreements for zoning 
changes. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda Herrick) at p 112, 1. 22 - p. 113,1. 5, p. 
121,11. 12-17. 
The CIP was implemented, after due discussion between the Valley County 
Commissioners, the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Valley County 
Road Department Supervisor. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at 
p. 45, 1. 12 - p. 48, 1. 15.) The Valley County Commissioners directed the Valley County 
Planning and Zoning Commission to begin placing a condition to final approval of developments 
upon developers to enter into a RDA with the County to pay for impacts on County roads based 
on the CIP and calculations arrived by the County and its engineers. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A 
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 45, 1. 18 - p. 50, 1. 5; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. B 
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(deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 110,1. 1 - p. 111,1. 25.; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ~ 3. As a result, the 
Planning and Zoning Department began conditioning final plat approval on developers entering 
into an agreement with the County to pay for road impacts. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition 
of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 49, 11. 12-17; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda 
Herrick) at p. 59,11. 13-19, p. 65, 1. 12 - p. 66, 1. 1, p. 68, 11. 2-10; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ,-r 3. 
Buckskin's Land Use Application: 
Buckskin submitted a land use application to Valley County on or about March 29,2004 
seeking to develop The Meadows, a multi-phase development project consisting of at least six 
phases. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 9; Affidavit of Cynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exs. 3, 4? The application was for a Planned Unit Development ("PUD"), 
Conditional Use Permit ("CUP"), Preliminary Plat and Final Plat for Phase 1 of The Meadows. 
Id. 
As part of the application, Buckskin attached two proposed agreements, a "development 
agreement" and a "capital contribution agreement." R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r,-r 3-8; Herrick Affidavit, 
Ex. 3. Buckskin submitted these proposed agreements with its application because Valley 
County's LUDO required that Buckskin, as the applicant for a PUD, enter into a development 
agreement. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r,-r 3-8. The idea to enter into a development agreement or pay an 
impact fee was not Buckskin's, but rather it was required under Valley County's LUDO and 
policies. 
The CIP area for The Meadows is the West Roseberry Area. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 14, Ex. 
G. For Phase 1 of The Meadows the impact fee was calculated by Valley County's engineer 
pursuant to a traffic impact study he conducted for the development of the Tamarack Resort. R. 
Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 5; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ,-r,-r 4-5, Exs. A, B. According to the engineer's traffic 
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impact study and his calculations, an impact fee of approximately $1,800.00 per residential unit 
was necessary to account for impacts of new development on the roadways located in the West 
Roseberry CIP area. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 5-7; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ~~ 4-5, Exs. A, B. This amount 
and the fact that Valley County planned to require that all developers enter into an agreement 
with Valley County to pay the impact fee as a condition to approval of a land use application was 
determined before Buckskin filed its application. R. Vol. I, p. 130, ~~ 4-5, Exs. A, B. 
Buckskin's proposed "capital contribution agreement" attached to its application 
identified the payment of an impact fee as required by the LUDO. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 6-8; 
Herick Affidavit, Ex. 3 (Appendix C). Buckskin and Valley County never entered into the 
proposed "development agreement" attached to Buckskin's application. 
Valley County required that Buckskin sign a Capital Contribution Agreement that was 
different than the agreement proposed in its application. Valley County's Capital Contribution 
Agreement for Phase 1 of The Meadows contained terms relating only to the payment of impact 
fees and nothing more. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 11, p. 334. The impact fee was calculated by Valley 
County's Engineer as $1,844 per lot. R. Vol. II, p. 338. According to the terms of the Capital 
Contribution Agreement for Phase 1 of The Meadows, Buckskin was required to pay impact fees 
in the form ofa dedication of right-of-way in a total amount equal to or greater than $91,142.00. 
R. Vol. II, p. 335. A credit for impact fees under future phases was granted to Buckskin for the 
amount the dedicated right-of-way exceeded the impact fee for Phase 1 of The Meadows. 
Buckskin likewise was required to pay an impact fee for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows 
when it applied for Final Plat approval of these phases. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 12-13. On or about 
September 26,2005, Buckskin entered into another contract, this time titled "Road Development 
2 The Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment was sent to the Clerk of the Idaho 
Supreme Court as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record and will be subsequently referred to as the "Herrick Affidavit." 
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Agreement," for the payment of impact fees in order to receive Final Plat approval for Phases 2 
and 3 of The Meadows. R. Vol. II, p. 344. 
Under the RDA, Buckskin was assessed an impact fee of $247,096 and after the deducting 
$14,936 in credits, Buckskin paid $232,160 to Valley County. R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 
254. The per lot impact fee assessment for Phases 2 and 3 was also calculated at $1,844 by 
Valley County's Engineer. R. Vol. II, p. 344. The RDA for Phases 2 and 3 also was not 
negotiated or discussed prior to Valley County conditioning final plat approval on entering into 
the agreement. Jd.; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 13. 
Buckskin prepared to get final plat approval to develop Phases 4 through 6 of The 
Meadows on or around August 2007. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 14; R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~~ 6-8; R. Vol. 
III, p. 255, ~~ 4-5. Based on Valley County's impact fee, as calculated by Valley County's 
Engineer under the West Roseberry Area 2007 Roadway Capital Improvement Program, the fee 
was unilaterally and arbitrarily increased from $1,844.00 per building lot to $3,968.00 per 
building lot. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 14, Ex. G. This increase was both startling and unanticipated. As 
a result of the increase, Buckskin representatives scheduled a meeting with the Valley County 
Road Superintendent to discuss the RDA and the increase in the fee. R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~~ 4-5; 
R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~ 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 15-16. 
At this meeting the Road Superintendent informed the Buckskin representatives that they 
had to enter into a RDA and that they had to pay the fee in full to get final plat. Vol. II, p. 249, 
~~ 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~~ 4-5; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 15-16. When questioned about the impact 
fee and why it more than tripled from Phases 2 and 3, the Road Superintendent told the Buckskin 
representatives that he hoped someone would take Valley County to court to figure out if the 
RDA's and the impact fees required under the agreements were legal. R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~~ 4-5; 
R. Vol. II., p. 249, ~~ 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 15-16. 
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Despite Valley County's defense that the payment of impact fees was voluntary, 
Buckskin's experience was similar or the same as all other developers. Valley County required 
developers to enter into a RDA regardless of the size of the development, including a one-lot 
subdivision. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 70,1. 25 - p. 71, 
1. 5. Valley County unilaterally determined the impact fee for each of the CIP areas. Villegas 
Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 71,11. 6-25. As the projects neared 
the point where approval of a final plat was necessary, developers generally paid a visit to the 
Valley County Road Department to discuss the RDA and how it would be implemented. 
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 49, 1. 12 - p. 50, 1. 5. 
The actual RDA was prepared by Valley County and its engineer; when the agreement 
was finalized, it was sent to the County Commissioners for approval. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A 
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 50,1. 6 - p. 52,1. 6. The RDA also had to be signed by 
the developer and the impact fee paid before the developer could get on the agenda for the Board 
of County Commissioners to consider the developer's Final Plat. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A 
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 106, 1. 23 p. 109, 1. 9. This process of finalizing the 
RDA and identifying the impact fee the developer was required to pay under the agreement 
usually happened well after the initial approval of the application for a CUP. Villegas Affidavit, 
Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 117, 1. 8 - p. 119, 1. 24. 
Other than the amount of the fee paid under the RDA, the wording of the agreements 
generally did not vary from developer to developer. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of 
Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 125,11.2-7; See also R. Vol. 1, p. 123; R. Vol. I, p. 169; R. Vol. I, p. 
178; R. Vol. I, p. 181; R. Vol. I, p. 194; R. Vol. I, p. 204; R. Vol. I, p. 221; R. Vol. II, p. 273; R. 
Vol. II, p. 334; R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 394; R. Vol. II, p. 404. Developers, however, did 
not know the contents of or the terms and conditions of a RDA when their CUP was approved 
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with the condition that they enter into a RDA. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda 
Herrick) at p. 83,1. 24 - p. 84,1. 16. Unquestionably, signing the RDA and paying the required 
fee under the agreement, however, was a required condition to obtaining Final Plat approval and 
authorization to begin construction. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon 
Cruickshank) at p. 137, 1. 6 - p. 138, 1. 21; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda 
Herrick) at p. 101, 1. 23 - p. 102,1. 3, p. 107,1. 10 - p. 109, 1. 9, p. 104, 1. 2-18; Villegas 
Affidavit, Ex. B (deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 65,1. 16 - p. 68,1. 2. 
More than a year after Buckskin initiated this litigation, the Board of County 
Commissioners of Valley County, on March 7, 2011, approved Resolution 11-6. R. Vol. III, p. 
551. This resolution purports to place a moratorium on Valley County's CIP and RDA 
requirement. Id. The resolution was adopted four days before a hearing on these matters. Based 
on Resolution 11-6, Valley County argued that Buckskin's claims were also moot. The district 
court agreed. R. Vol. III, p. 596. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. When does an inverse condemnation action accrue for fees paid on a multi-phase 
development project? 
B. Should this Court apply a standard similar to the "project completion rule" for the 
purpose of accrual of the statute of limitations in an inverse condemnation case 
involving a multi-phase development project? 
C. Did the district court err in holding Resolution 11-6 mooted Appellant Buckskin's 
request for declaratory relief? 
D. Did the district court err in dismissing Appellant Buckskin's illegal fee/tax claim on 
summary judgment? 
E. Did the district court err in refusing to apply the five-year statute of limitations in 
this case to a claim based upon a written instrument? 
F. Is Appellant Buckskin entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
This Court employs the same standard as the district court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 
208 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw. I.R.c.P. 56(c); Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133,59 P.3d 302,305 
(2002). The Court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. Id. The non-moving party must set forth genuine issues of material fact 
by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P.56(e). Regarding constitutional claims or the interpretation 
and application of a legislative act, this Court independently determines whether the facts 
support a violation. Willie at 133, 59 P.3d at 305.; Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80 
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
II. When does an inverse condemnation action accrue for fees paid on a multi-phase 
development project? 
Appellant, Buckskin filed this lawsuit seeking in part, to recover monies it paid to the 
County under its Capital Improvements Program for Phases 2 and 3. Specifically, Buckskin paid 
$232,160 in road mitigation fees to the County in order to get final plat for Phases 2 and 3 of The 
Meadows Subdivision. R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 254. One of the theories for recovery 
raised by Buckskin was inverse condemnation; Buckskin asked that it be paid "just 
compensation" for the fees paid on Phases 2 and 3. 
Buckskin contends that the district court erred in dismissing its inverse condemnation 
claim for the Phase 2 and 3 impact fee payments because: (a) the justiciability requirement of 
ripeness requires that each payment should have been considered a separate taking with separate 
accrual dates; (b) the district court improperly expanded the test for determining the accrual of an 
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inverse condemnation claim; and (c) public policy considerations support a finding that separate 
takings with separate accrual dates occurred in this case with each payment of impact fees. 
A. Ripeness considerations favor a finding of separate takings. 
The district court's holding fails to consider issues of justiciability and is in direct conflict 
with this Court's requirement that a claim must be ripe before it can be adjudicated. Ripeness is 
a fundamental prerequisite to invoke a Court's jurisdiction-a harm must be sufficiently matured 
to warrant judicial intervention. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 936, 155 P.3d 1166, 
1175 (2007) (citing Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217,1220 (2002)). The 
central concern of the ripeness doctrine is whether the case involves uncertain or contingent 
future events that mayor may not occur as anticipated or, indeed, may not occur at all. See 
Lewis v. Cant'! Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479-80, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). In 
other words, ripeness relates to the timing of a suit and asks whether a case is brought too early. 
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005). 
In this case, Buckskin was required to pay an impact fee for each phase as each phase 
carne up for final plat. In dismissing Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim on the four year 
statute of limitations, the district court held that since The Meadows development was covered 
under one Conditional Use Permit, all future phases were subject to that specific accrual date. 
R. Vol. III, p. 583. 
The district court's reliance on the fact that Buckskin's project was approved under one 
conditional use permit for the entire project demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
multi-phase development. The Meadows is a multi-phase mixed use development. Vitally 
important to Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim is that each and every phase of a multi-
phase development requires a separate approval of Final Plat by the County Commissioners. See 
I.e. § 67-6504 (the governing board only, not a planning and zoning commission, has full 
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authority to "finally approve land subdivisions"). Valley County's LUDO outlines the process 
for obtaining PUD approvals, each of which is approved separately starting with Concept 
Approval and ending with Final Plat approval for each phase in a multi-phase development. See 
R. Vol. II, p. 290. Just because Final Plat of one phase is approved does not guarantee or mean 
that future phases will receive Final Plat approval. 
The district court's holding is in error because it flies in the face of the doctrine of 
rIpeness. When the impact fees were paid on Phase 1 no other payments were made and 
therefore no other takings had occurred. Had Buckskin sued for "just compensation" for all 
future fees it had yet to pay, that lawsuit would have been dismissed because the claims would 
not have been ripe. This Court has held that a party cannot maintain an inverse condemnation 
action unless there has actually been a taking of property. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 
Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56,60 (2003) (citing COVington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,53 
P.3d 828 (2002)). Even when a fee payer knows in advance that a fee will be collected it has not 
ripened enough to bring an inverse condemnation lawsuit. Thus, the district court's reasoning 
that Buckskin knew it would have to pay impact fees on future phases is irrelevant. 
The only way for Buckskin to be receive "just compensation" for impact fee payments 
paid on later phases without running afoul of the doctrine of ripeness is to find that each impact 
fee assessment triggers a new and separate accrual period. 
B. There Was No Substantial Interference with Buckskin's Property Interest 
In the Money Paid for Phases 2 and 3 When It Dedicated Real Property 
For Right Of Way As Payment For Phase 1. 
A second reason for finding that Buckskin's impact fee payments on Phases 2 and 3 
should be treated as separate takings-and hence separate accrual dates-is the fact that there was 
no substantial interference with Buckskin's money paid for Phases 2 and 3 when it paid the 
impact fee for Phase 1 by giving right of way. 
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This Court has held that the test for determining when an inverse condemnation action 
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the 
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' 
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City a/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,671,603 P.2d 
1001, 1005 (1979) (underlining added). The district court relied on the above quoted rule oflaw 
to fix the accrual date for all of Buckskin's phases at the time payment was made on Phase 1, 
reasoning that: "[i]t is irrelevant that the project was divided into separate phases because the 
entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and [Buckskin] had no reason to 
believe that the later phases of the project would not be subject to the same impact fees as the 
earlier phases of the project." R. Vol. III, p. 583. The district court's reasoning however 
impermissibly expands the rule in Tibbs to require that a property owner need only be aware that 
a taking is likely to occur. Merely being aware that a taking of one's property is imminent does 
not rise to the level of "substantial interference" nor is it sufficient to start the clock on the statute 
of limitations. 
The facts are undisputed that Buckskin paid impact fees on Phase 1 in the form of giving 
real property for right-of-way. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 11; R. Vol. II, p. 334. When Buckskin gave 
real property to Valley County it cannot be said that there was also a "substantial interference" 
with Buckskin's property interest in its money that would be eventually paid on later phases. 
The money remained in Buckskin's bank account. Buckskin was free to do whatever it wanted 
to do with its money, and in fact, if it chose not to complete the project, it had no obligation to 
pay the impact fee. Whether The Meadows was governed by a single CUP is not a controlling 
factor. Rather, the separate impact fee payments made as each phase comes for final plat 
approval should be the trigger for accrual because that is when there is a substantial interference 
with Buckskin's money. See also, Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88-89, 730 P.2d 
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1005, 1008-09 (1986) (holding "we have never held that a statute of limitations may run before 
an aggrieved party suffers damages."). 
C. Public policy considerations favor a finding of separate takings hence 
separate accrual dates. 
Public policy concerns and the interest of justice favor a holding from this Court that 
each impact fee assessment for the various phases starts a separate accrual date because to hold 
otherwise would lead to an unconscionable result. The district court's decision allows a 
governmental entity to increase the amount of an unauthorized fee on multi-phase projects with 
no fear of recourse if the statute of limitations is allowed to run once the first impact fee is paid. 
Here, there is no dispute that The Meadows is a multi-phase project. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~ 
3; Herrick Affidavit, Ex. 3. More importantly, the fact that final plat has not been recorded for 
the final phases of The Meadows demonstrates that completion of a multi-phase project mayor 
will take longer than four years. Those facts coupled with the fact that Valley County has now 
increased the impact fee assessment to more than two times per lot for the final phases of The 
Meadows shows how the district court's holding produces an unconscionable result. 
When Buckskin executed the RDA for Phases 2 and 3 the impact fee assessment was 
$1,844 per single family lot and $1,383 per apartment dwelling unit. R. Vol. II, p. 344, 349. 
According to Valley County's West Roseberry Area 2007 Capital Improvement Program Cost 
Estimate, the impact fee for a residential lot has now more than doubled to $3,968 per lot. R. 
Vol. II, p. 350. Therefore, under the district court's holding, since Buckskin's cause of action for 
all phases accrued at the payment of Phase 1 fees, Valley County is now free to unilaterally raise 
the amount because Buckskin is barred from bringing an inverse condemnation action for 
subsequent payments. This unconscionable result should not be allowed to stand and the only 
way to avoid that result is to treat each assessment as a separate taking. 
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III. Should this Court apply a standard similar to the "project completion rule" for the 
purpose of accrual of the statute of limitations in an inverse condemnation case 
involving a multi-phase development project? 
If this Court disagrees with Buckskin that each impact fee assessment should be treated 
as a separate taking, Buckskin argues, in the alternative, that this Court should hold that the 
statute of limitations has not accrued. Specifically, Buckskin asks this Court to apply a standard 
similar to the "project completion rule" established by this Court in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon 
Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) and apply it to multi-phase projects. 
Unless and until all impact fees are paid and Final Plat is approved on the very last phase, the 
statute of limitations cannot accrue. 
Generally, the standard test for determining when an inverse condemnation action 
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the 
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' 
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City oj Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 
1001, 1005 (1979). However, this Court has departed from the Tibbs standard the facts and 
circumstances of a case and public policy required application of a different standard. 
In C&G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) this 
Court departed from the Tibbs rule holding that where government takes property by way of a 
construction project, the property owner has the "right to wait until completion of the project 
before his or her inverse condemnation claim accrues for purposes of calculating the statute of 
limitations." Id. at 144. That rule has been referred to by this Court as the "construction 
completion rule." 
In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt a road over C&G's property. Id. at 141. 
The Highway District believed it owned an easement over the section line and could rebuild the 
road without compensating C&G for taking the property on which the road would be built. Id. 
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The Highway District advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to 
compensation for a taking of its property. Id. C&G believed the Highway District's 
representations without further inquiry. Id. 
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction of the road's subbase 
and construction was totally finished by November 1993. ld. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January 
1997, when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there 
was no easement over the section line. Id. C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action 
against the Highway District on January 31, 1997. Id. C&G prevailed before the district court 
and the Highway District appealed on grounds that the four year statute of limitations barred 
C&G's lawsuit. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the Tibbs standard on the issue of 
accrual and instead applied the "project completion rule." In doing so, this Court adopted its 
reasoning in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981) (project completion rule 
applied to when notice provisions of Idaho Tort Claims Act is triggered) and found that there is 
no reliable method to determine the extent of damages when property is taken through a 
construction project until the construction project is completed. Id. at 144-145. Furthermore, 
this Court held that ripeness considerations favored departure from the Tibbs standard because a 
"landowner subjected to the taking of his or her property by a government construction project 
should not be required to prematurely bring an inverse condemnation claim before damages can 
be fully assessed." Id. 
In addition to ripeness and speculative damages concerns, the C&G Court looked at other 
policy considerations to justify its holding. One interesting consideration was this Court's 
recognition that C&G's claim should also not be barred gIVen the Highway District's 
misrepresentation to C&G that it had an easement over their property: 
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Furthermore, the Highway District's erroneous belief it had an easement over the 
section line caused the confusion in this case. It would be bad precedent for this 
Court to condone the government's misrepresentation, albeit innocently mistaken, 
by holding otherwise. The project completion rule promotes judicial economy 
and certainty, which benefits all parties involved in a takings case. 
Id. at 144 (underlining added). 
In this case the facts present similar ripeness and policy considerations found in C&G and 
provide compelling reasons for this Court to depart from the Tibbs standard and adopt a tolling 
standard like the construction completion rule to multi-phase projects. Like C&G, Buckskin's 
damages would be speculative because it cannot know what each fee assessment will cost until it 
actually files for Final Plat on each of its phases. There are two reasons why damages are 
speculative. First, Buckskin will not know how many building lots it will actually include for 
construction in each phase until it actually seeks Final Plat approval. The number of lots 
included in a phase may be dictated by a number of factors, but it is not an exactly known 
quantity at the time the CUP was approved. Since Valley County's road impact fee is calculated 
based on the number of lots in a phase, damages are purely speculative until final plat approval is 
sought and the exact number of lots is determined. 
Secondly, and more significantly, Valley County has demonstrated by its own actions in 
this case that damages are purely speculative until Final Plat approval is sought by a developer. 
At the commencement of construction for Phase 1 of The Meadows Subdivision, Valley County 
identified a per lot road impact fee of$1,844. R. Vol. II, p. 338. When Buckskin applied for and 
received final plat approval for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows and entered into a new RDA 
with Valley County, the per lot road impact fee was again calculated at $1,844. R. Vol. II, p. 
349. As Buckskin began preparations to obtain final plat approval for Phases 4 through 6 of The 
Meadows Subdivision, it was informed that Valley County had unilaterally and without notice 
increased the per lot road impact fee to $3,968. This represents a more than two fold increase in 
APPELLANTS' BRlEF - 19 
the road impact fee. See R. Vol. II, p. 351; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 14-17; R. Vol. II, p. 250, ~~ 5-8; 
R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~~ 4-5. 
Buckskin's damages for inverse condemnation on Phases 2 and 3 were speculative until it 
was required to actually pay the road impact fees, and remain speculative for the future phases of 
The Meadows. The evidence in the record also establishes that the road impact fees exacted 
from developers by Valley County may unilaterally increase at the County's whim without 
notice. Not only is this egregiously unfair, it more than illustrates the speculative nature of 
Buckskin's inverse condemnation damages before Final Plat approval was (or is) sought and the 
road impact fee was actually paid. 
Public policy considerations in this case also compel departure from the Tibbs standard. 
Like C&G, Buckskin was mislead into believing that Valley County could collect an impact fee. 
The County's ordinance (i.e. the LUDO) governing applications for planned unit developments 
states that the County can impose impact fees. Specifically, Section I and J of Appendix C of the 
LUDO requires the payment of impact fees. R. Vol. II, p. 280, 298. Additionally, prior to 
Buckskin filing this lawsuit, at least one sitting Valley County Commissioner, during a public 
hearing on September 28, 2009, expressed serious doubts about the legality of Valley County's 
CIP/Road Development Agreements by stating: 
. .. we have been working under an understanding which has been proven to be 
incorrect, legally incorrect, on our road development agreements. And we need to 
make a change. We need to make a change if we're going to continue those and 
we need to be in compliance with Idaho state law if we're going to continue road 
agreements, road fees, whatever you want to call them, we need to be in 
compliance with Idaho state law. 
And in order to be there, under today's Idaho state law we have to adopt impact 
fees at least .... 
Villegas Affidavit, Ex D (Deposition of Frank W. Eld), p. 55, 1. 25 - p. 56, 1. 12. This 
Commissioner also testified that Valley County had two legal opinions that the Road 
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Development Agreement method of raising funds violated Idaho law. Jd., at p. 62,1. 23 - p. 63, 
1. 25. 
Although the LUDO states that impact fees can be collected, the County admits that it 
never enacted an ID IF A compliant impact fee ordinance. R. VoL I, p. 33. This further provides 
a policy basis for departing from the Tibbs standard in this case. Not only did Valley County's 
LUDO incorrectly state that impact fees can be collected, Valley County continued its illegal 
scheme by adopting a uniform practice of conditioning approval of Final Plat upon applicants 
entering into a RDA. Now, the County uses that fact to fabricate a defense that the fees were 
paid were voluntary and hence not a taking. The affidavits submitted by Buckskin 
representatives, the affidavits from other developers, deposition testimony from current and 
former county commissioners and the County's very own Master Transportation Plan all point to 
the fact that impact fee payments were required. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
IV. Did the district court err in holding Resolution 11-6 mooted Appellant Buckskin's 
request for declaratory relief? 
Valley County's Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's request for a declaratory 
judgment that it does not have to pay a road impact fee for Phases 4, 5, and 6 of The Meadows. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Valley County approved Resolution 11-6 on March 7, 
2011, well over a year after Buckskin initiated this legislation. Resolution 11-6 is a misguided 
attempt to moot Buckskin's claims related to future phases of The Meadows Subdivision. Based 
on the nature of a resolution and the very language of Resolution 11-6, the district court erred in 
ruling that Buckskin's claims related to its future phases were moot. 
Resolution 11-6 purports to place a moratorium on Valley County's road development 
fee program and RDA requirement. R. Vol. III, p. 55l. For those developers that have yet to 
enter into an RDA, Section 2 of Resolution 11-6 requires applicants to either voluntarily pay 
road impact fees until Valley County adopts an IDIFA-compliant ordinance or to negotiate 
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RDA's with the County, reservmg to Valley County the unilateral authority to deny an 
application based on its inability to secure funding under its CIP. R. Vol. III, p. 552-53. For 
existing RDA's, under Section 4 of Resolution 11-6, developers have an opportunity to 
voluntarily pay a fee, put the development on hold, or negotiate a new RDA. R. Vol. III, p. 553. 
If an IDIF A-compliant ordinance is not in place, Valley County: 
will seek other ways to meet its obligation to ensure that adequate public services 
are available to serve the new development. This could include conditions 
respecting the sequence and timing of development so as to ensure that 
development occur [sic] on a schedule consistent with the availability of public 
serVIces. 
R. Vol. III, p. 553. 
As part of its Complaint, Buckskin requested a declaratory judgment that Valley 
County's practice of requiring developers to pay impact fees is in violation of Idaho law and is 
invalid. R. Vol. I, p. 4. After the district court issued its initial Memorandum Decision, Valley 
County filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment on January 13, 2011, asking the district court to 
dismiss Buckskin's Complaint with prejudice. R. Vol. III, p. 498. Buckskin objected to this 
motion on grounds that the district court's Memorandum Decision did not dispose of all the 
claims raised in its Complaint, including Buckskin's claim for declaratory relief that it did not 
have to pay impact fees for the final phases. R. Vol. III, p. 510. On March 9, 2011, Valley 
County replied to Buckskin's objection, in part, on grounds that Resolution 11-6, adopted two 
days earlier, rendered Buckskin's claims moot. R. Vol. III, pp. 540, 548, Ex. 1. A hearing was 
held two days later, on March 11, 2011, which included arguments related to the newly adopted 
Resolution 11-6. The district court agreed and entered judgment on behalf of Valley County, 
dismissing Buckskin's entire Complaint with prejudice. 
In ruling against Buckskin on Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, the district 
court found that Resolution 11-6 mooted Buckskin's declaratory judgment claims for the future 
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phases of The Meadows Subdivision because Buckskin now has a chance under Resolution 11-6 
to negotiate a RDA for phases 4-6 of The Meadows. R. Vol. III, p. 579-80. The district court 
erred in its ruling with regard to the effect of Resolution 11-6 because Resolution 11-6 is an 
improper method to address the illegal impact fee issue, Valley County has no authority to 
require Buckskin to negotiate a RDA for the remaining phases of The Meadows Subdivision, and 
any claim for the future yet-to-be completed phases of The Meadows are now improperly 
subjected to the res judicata effect of the district court's entry of judgment. 
A. Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's claim for a declaratory 
judgment in relation to the future phases of its development because the 
ordinances requiring the payment of an illegal impact fee remain in force. 
Though Valley County clearly adopted Resolution 11-6 in response to this litigation, it 
does not moot Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment related to the development of future 
phases of The Meadows Subdivision. Resolution 11-6 is just that, a resolution. It does not 
create any binding authority on Valley County and may be revoked or withdrawn as quickly and 
as easily as it was adopted. If anything, the facts of this case and the timing of adoption of this 
resolution suggest that it was passed merely to create a mootness argument. As set forth below, 
Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's request for declaratory relief that it does not have to 
pay an impact fee or otherwise mitigate for traffic impacts on Phases 4, 5, and 6 of The 
Meadows. Further, under IDIFA an ordinance is the only allowed method for placing any 
requirement for the payment of impact fees on a land use applicant. 
A government body generally may act by ordinance or resolution unless a particular 
mode of action is required by constitution or statute. Snake River Homebuilders Assn. v. 
Caldwell, 101 Idaho 47, 48, 607 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1980). Regardless, a resolution is very 
different from an ordinance. A resolution is a mere expression of opinion of the governing body 
and, unlike an ordinance, is not a law. See City a/Salisbury v. Nagel, 420 S.W.2d 37 (Kans. Ct. 
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App. 1967) (citing 37 Am. JUL Municipal Corporations s 142; 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 
s 411; Vol. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, s 15.02; Baker v. Lake City Sewer Dist., 30 
Wash.2d 510,191 P.2d 844). 
Under ID IF A, Valley County is required to enact an ordinance to collect impact fees. 
I.C § 67-8207. Thus a particular mode of action is required under Idaho law to address the 
payment of any impact fee. Resolution 11-6 remains nothing more than an attempt by Valley 
County to circumvent the requirements of IDIFA. Under its own terms, continued development 
will be allowed in Valley County only if the developer expressly volunteers to pay road impact 
fees or if the County decides to allow the development nonetheless. Valley County ominously 
reserves to itself the right to either deny an application based on its inability to obtain funds 
under its CIP or to dictate the timing and sequence of development. This is simply not allowed 
by IDIF A. Resolution 11-6 cannot be used to avoid the requirements of IDIF A. 
Further, the provisions of the County's LUDO and CIP scheme remain in place. Valley 
County has admitted that it has not enacted an IDIF A compliant ordinance, nor has it taken any 
steps to do so. Therefore, Sections I and J of Appendix C to Valley County's LUDO requiring 
the payment of impact fees through a development agreement or otherwise is illegal. None of 
the controlling legal mechanisms have changed, been abolished, or replaced with an ordinance 
compliant with the IDIFA. As for Buckskin, Valley County's future enactment of an IDIFA-
compliant ordinance is of little relevance because it is the ordinances in place at the time of the 
application that apply, not a future IDIFA-compliant ordinance. See South Fork Coalition v. Bd 
of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 861, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (1990) (holding that 
an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinances in place at the time of the application). 
The enactment of an ID IF A -compliant ordinance is irrelevant to Buckskin's existing CUP. 
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Thus, Valley County leaves itself with the same power to deny Buckskin final plat 
approval if Buckskin refuses to "voluntarily" pay an illegal impact fee for road development 
purposes. Resolution 11-6 does not answer the problem or moot the issue. Buckskin was 
entitled to a declaration voiding the offending ordinance provisions in the LUDO as well as a 
declaration that it did not have to pay impact fees for the final phases of The Meadows. 
B. Valley County does not have legal authority to require Buckskin to enter 
into a Road Development Agreement under Resolution 11-6. 
Valley County has limited authority to require a developer to enter into a road 
development agreement. Resolution 11-6 still requires Buckskin to negotiate for a RDA in order 
to proceed with development of future phases of The Meadows. Valley County, however, has no 
authority under Idaho law to require Buckskin to negotiate or enter into a development 
agreement of any kind outside the context of a rezone of property. Under the Local Land Use 
Planning Act ("LLUP A"), a governmental body is granted the authority to require an applicant to 
enter into a development agreement only if the application requests a re-zoning of the subject 
property. Section 67-6511A of LLUPA, entitled "Development Agreements," states, in relevant 
part: "[ e ]ach governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance with the 
notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, require or permit ~ 
a condition o(rezoning that an owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the 
use or development of the subject parcel." I.C. § 67-6511 A (emphasis added). 
There was no rezone as a part of Buckskin's application. Buckskin applied for a Planned 
Unit Development and Conditional Use Permit, not a rezone. The County has no authority under 
Resolution 11-6 to require a party to negotiate or enter into a development agreement outside of 
circumstances where a request for a rezone is included in the application. The district court erred 
in concluding that Buckskin even "negotiate" a new development agreement because Valley 
County has no authority to require Buckskin to negotiate for and enter into a development 
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agreement of any kind. Further related to this, it is highly questionable what, exactly, will be the 
subject of any such development agreement aside from the payment of road impact fees. The 
RDA's required by Valley County prior to Resolution 11-6 dealt solely with the payment of road 
development fees. See R. Vol. 1, p. 123; R. Vol. I, p. 169; R. Vol. I, p. 178; R. Vol. I, p. 181; R. 
Vol. I, p. 194; R. Vol. I, p. 204; R. Vol. I, p. 221; R. Vol. II, p. 273; R. Vol. II, p. 334; R. Vol. II, 
p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 394; R. Vol. II, p. 404. 
Resolution 11-6 essentially states that payment of such fees will be required for approval 
of any application due to the alleged impacts of the development. Otherwise it is entirely unclear 
what exactly developers have to negotiate with Valley County in relation to a road development 
agreement besides the payment of a road impact fee. Valley County has no legal authority to 
require Buckskin to negotiate a RDA under Resolution 11-6. 
C. Dismissing Buckskin's Complaint with prejudice leaves Buckskin without 
the possibility of redress for any violation of the law with regard to the 
future phases of its development. 
Valley County has preserved to itself all the necessary power under Resolution 11-6 to 
mandate or require the payment of an impact fee as a condition to approval of a land use 
application or approval of final plat by maintaining, under Sections 2 and 4, the right to deny 
applications based on impacts or the right to control the timing and sequence of development. 
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Buckskin is entitled to a declaration that Valley County's 
road development fee and its ordinances and programs requiring payment of road development 
fees are invalid under the law, even if no other relief is available to Buckskin. I.C. § 10-1212; 
See also Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 773, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006) (holding that a 
declaratory action is appropriate if it will clarify and settle the legal relations at issue, if such 
declaration will afford relief from uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and 
if deferring adjudication would add nothing to the legal issues presented); See also Ayers v. 
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General Hospital, 67 Idaho 430,434, 182 P.2d 958,959 (1947) (recognizing that a declaratory 
action is appropriate to invoke remedial or preventative relief, or for a potential threat). 
Resolution 11-6 is subject to change at Valley County's whim. The County may revise 
Resolution 11-6 or it may withdraw it altogether. It is nothing more than an expression of the 
County Commissioner's opinion or mind with regard to Valley County's impact fee scheme. 
Despite the representations made in Resolution 11-6, there is absolutely no assurance that 
Buckskin's rights will not be impacted with regard to the development of future phases of The 
Meadows. The discussion above regarding Valley County's unilateral and arbitrary increase of 
the road impact fee by more than double between Phases 2 and 3 and Phases 4 to 6 of The 
Meadows is a perfect illustration of why it is necessary for Buckskin to obtain a declaratory 
judgment that Valley County's LUDO and CIP are illegal under Idaho law. Valley County's 
further hedging on whether it will actually follow Idaho law and adopt an IDIF A-compliant 
impact fee ordinance further illustrates Buckskin's need for a declaratory judgment with regard 
to the future phases of its development and whether Valley County's current impact fee scheme 
and program is illegal under Idaho law. 
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in granting Valley County's Motion for 
entry of judgment and in entering judgment on behalf of Valley County and dismissing all of 
Buckskin's claims with prejudice. Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's claim for 
declaratory judgment in this case. 
v. Did the district court err in dismissing Appellant Buckskin's illegal fee/tax claim on 
summary judgment? 
Valley County's CIP and LUDO provisions requiring the payment of road development 
fees is an impact fee scheme and constitutes an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax because 
Valley County has not followed the requirements under the enabling statutes ofIDIFA necessary 
to collect impact fees. In Count One of its Complaint, Buckskin requested a declaratory 
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judgment that Valley County's road impact fee scheme is an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax 
because Valley County has not enacted an ordinance to collect impact fees under IDIFA. R. Vol. 
I, pp. 4-5. The District Court essentially agreed with Buckskin, finding in its Memorandum 
Decision Re: Summary Judgment that: "[h]ere Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact fees 
under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have the authority to 
impose the impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the procedures set forth in I.C. § 
67-8206." R. Vol. III, p. 492. 
Based on the District Court's finding and because Valley County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment only addressed Count Two of Buckskin's Complaint for its claim of inverse 
condemnation, Buckskin moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of its Complaint that 
the RDA fee constitutes an unauthorized impact fee and/or illegal tax. R. Vol. III, p. 494. 
Buckskin again raised the issue of its unadjudicated illegal fee and tax claim in objecting to 
Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, which sought to dismiss all of Buckskin's claims 
with prejudice. R. Vol. III, p. 510. During the district court's March 11,2011 hearing on the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Buckskin's counsel again raised the issue of Buckskin's 
illegal fee and tax claim against Valley County. Tf. Vol. I, p. 2, L. 17 - p. 5, L. 2. 
The district court denied Buckskin's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I 
on grounds that: " ... the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and at 
the very latest, October 25,2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to run on all 
of the Plaintiffs' claims ... because ... it was at that point in time ... a substantial interference 
with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent." R. Vol. III, p. 579. The District Court 
held that: "October 25, 2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have 
began to run as a matter of law." Id. Other than to recite the legal standard on which it 
dismissed Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim, the district court provided no other analysis 
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as to why Buckskin was not entitled to summary judgment on its illegal fee and tax declaratory 
jUdgment claim despite the fact the district comi essentially agreed that Valley County's impact 
fee ordinance is illegal. 
The district court's ruling is in error with regard to Buckskin's claim for payment of an 
illegal fee or tax. Buckskin's additional claim (i.e. declaration of illegal tax and violation of the 
Idaho Development Impact Fee Act) is completely distinct, and must be addressed apart from the 
inverse condemnation claim. The district court's ruling either ignores Count I of Buckskin's 
Complaint or it subsumes Buckskin's illegal fee or tax claim within its inverse condemnation 
claim, and assigns to the illegal fee or tax claim the same standard for accrual as for inverse 
condemnation. 
Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that Valley County's RDA scheme and the 
fee required under the RDA is an illegal fee or tax is wholly separate from Buckskin's claim for 
inverse condemnation. In fact, the legal standard for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim 
has no application to Buckskin's claim for payment of an illegal fee or tax. The correct standard 
of accrual for an illegal fee or tax claim is the date upon which the illegal fee or tax was paid. 
A. Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that the fee it paid under Valley 
County's Road DevelopmentAgreement scheme is illegal is a separate claim 
from its inverse condemnation claim. 
That a claim to recover payment of an illegal and unauthorized fee is a separate and 
distinct claim from a claim for inverse condemnation cannot be seriously disputed. This Court 
long ago recognized that a claim for payment of an illegal tax in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution is as an independent, stand-alone cause of action under Idaho law. In Brewster v. 
City of Pocatello this Court overturned a city ordinance imposing a street maintenance and 
restoration fee on owners of property abutting a public street. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 
Idaho 502, 504-05, 768 P.2d 765, 767-78 (1988) (holding that the fee at issue was a revenue 
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generating measure and constituted an unauthorized and illegal tax without specific statutory 
authority to charge such a fee from the legislature). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of BOise, 
this Court reviewed and invalidated a city liquor license transfer fee because the city had no 
authority to impose such a fee. BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357-58, 
63 P.3d 482,483-84 (2003) (holding that any authority of a county to regulate a matter for which 
the state constitution authorized the legislature to act must come from the legislature and the 
relevant statutory authority did not grant the municipality the authority to impose this fee). 
Likewise, in Idaho Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, this Court 
struck down an impact fee required by the city for all new building permits because the fee was 
imposed in violation of IDIF A. Idaho Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995) (finding that IDIFA is the only enabling statute 
permitting the collection of an impact fee and absent an IDIF A compliant ordinance the building 
permit fee is a non-individual assessed tax). 
As these cases demonstrate, a claim against a government entity to recover the payment 
of an illegal and unauthorized fee or tax is clearly a recognized and accepted cause of action 
under Idaho law. Buckskin pleaded a claim for illegal fee or tax as an alternative to its inverse 
condemnation claim. This is allowable under the applicable rules and law. "Under modern 
pleading rules parties may seek alternative or different types of relief regardless of consistency or 
whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both." MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 
345, 350, 612 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1980). Modern pleading rules merely require a simple and 
concise statement of the operative facts upon which relief may be granted on any sustainable 
theory and regardless of consistency. Id. (citing Bernstein v. u.s., 256 F.2d 697, 706 (1oth Cir. 
1958)). Several legal theories for recovery may draw upon the same core set facts. See 
Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987) 
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(acknowledging that plaintiffs in the case pleaded alternative claims based on several different 
legal theories). Certainly each legal theory is unique and each legal theory is subject to separate 
elements of proof and accrual triggers for statute of limitations purposes. 
This is illustrated in the case of Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, III Idaho 878, 
728 P.2d 767 (1986). In that case Intermountain West, Inc. began developing land that was 
subsequently annexed into Boise city limits. Id. at 878, 728 P.2d at 767. The City posted a stop 
work order because Intermountain West had not obtained building permits from the City after 
annexation of the property. Id. After the stop work orders were ignored, the City sought an 
injunction to stop the construction. Id. The court ruled in favor of Intermountain West on a 
vested rights theory and the City appealed. Id. at 879, 729 P.2d at 768. After that appeal, 
Intermountain West sued Boise City for damages caused by issuance of the stop work order and 
for inverse condemnation. Id. While both claims were dismissed as untimely, this Court 
reviewed each claim separately and identified different accrual dates for each claim. The tort 
cause of action accrued on September 3, 1975, because that was the date the stop work orders 
were lifted. Id. The inverse condemnation claim, on the other hand, accrued on a different date, 
no later than July 30, 1975, because that was the date the plaintiffs loss of its property became 
apparent. Id. at 880, 729 P.2d at 769. 
The distinction between Buckskin's claims and the required proof for each claim further 
illustrates the district court's error in dismissing Buckskin's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Idaho Constitution states that private property may be taken by the government 
for a public use, "but not until ajust compensation" has been paid for the property. Idaho Const. 
Art. 1, § 14. Thus the government's taking of private property for public use is not the conduct 
that violates the Idaho Constitution, but rather, it is the taking without the payment of just 
compensation. The Idaho Constitution is clear that the remedy is the payment of just 
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compensation, not declaratory relief preventing the taking of private property. Buckskin's 
request for declaratory relief that the fee collected under the RDA, on the other hand, will require 
evidence that Valley County engaged in an ultra vires act in violation of IDIF A. This proof must 
come by way of a declaratory action- an action that is separate from an inverse condemnation 
action. 
As illustrated by Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, a plaintiff may plead 
alternative theories for recovery, each of which is governed by different elements of proof and a 
distinct standard for triggering accrual of the statute of limitation. The district court's analysis 
that all Buckskin's claims, without regard to the nature of the claim or the elements of proof, 
accrued as of October 25,2004 because the entire PUD was approved under one conditional use 
permit was in error. Buckskin's declaratory judgment claim for an unauthorized and illegal fee 
or tax is a separate, alternative claim from its inverse condemnation claim and cannot be 
dismissed on the same procedural grounds the district court applied to Buckskin's inverse 
condemnation claim. 
B. The correct standard for accrual of the statute of limitations for a claim to 
recover payment of an unauthorized and illegal tax is the date the illegal tax 
is paid. 
There is no Idaho law assigning the test for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim to a 
claim against a government entity for the imposition of an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax, 
which is a separate and distinct cause of action from inverse condemnation. The district court 
further erred in assessing whether Buckskin's illegal fee or tax claim was timely under the same 
standard applied to Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim. The fact that this case happens to 
involve a land use application for a PUD that was granted under a single conditional use permit 
is not relevant. An illegal tax claim is not an inverse condemnation claim and the triggering 
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event for accrual of the statute of limitations for an illegal tax claim is clearly different than the 
standard that must be applied to a claim for inverse condemnation. 
The appropriate standard for the triggering or accrual of a claim for the payment of an 
unauthorized and illegal fee/tax is the date upon which the claimant was made to pay the fee. 
Though an Idaho court has not ruled on this question specifically, many other courts have. For 
example, in Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), the Illinois 
Supreme Court set the accrual date for payment of an illegal impact fee claim as the date the 
claimant paid the fee. Id. at 262. In that case, Sundance Homes, Inc., a developer, sued DuPage 
County for a declaratory judgment to return the road impact fee it paid under the County's road 
impact fee ordinance after the enabling statute was determined unconstitutional under Illinois 
law. Id. at 257. The developer argued that its cause of action did not accrue until the Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled the enabling statute unconstitutional. Id. at 258. After reviewing the 
underlying legal policy for a statute of limitations and what events trigger a statute of limitations, 
the court held that the event triggering the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment claim 
to return payment of an illegal fee is the date the fee was paid. Id. at 262. 
In Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005), the Texas Supreme Court likewise 
addressed the issue of when a claim for the payment of an illegal fee is triggered for statute of 
limitations purposes. In Lowenberg, the ordinance at issue required commercial property owners 
to pay a "fire registration fee." Id. at 801. The claimant sued the city alleging that the fee was an 
illegal tax. Id. The lower court agreed and the city appealed on grounds that the statute of 
limitations had expired because it accrued on the date the city passed the ordinance. Id. 
The Texas Supreme Court held that a claim to recover payment of an illegal fee charged 
by a government entity accrues on the date when the payment is made. Id. The Court stated that 
under Texas law the applicable statute of limitations was the same statute of limitations as for a 
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takings claim. Id. at 802. In setting the accrual date, the Court compared a regulatory taking to a 
physical taking and the distinct accrual dates for those distinct claims. ld. The Court reasoned 
that a claim for the payment of an illegal or unauthorized fee, as with a physical taking, is 
triggered on the date the fee was paid because that is the point in time the claimant is deprived of 
its money and the point in time at which the claimant suffers a wrong or an injury allowing the 
claimant to sue to recover. ld. Mere enactment of the ordinance, or some other arbitrary date 
prior to the actual payment of the illegal fee, does not harm or injure the claimant. ld. It is 
payment of the fee that causes the harm. ld. 
This rule is consistent with what other state and federal courts have identified as the 
accrual date for a claim to recover the payment of an illegal and unauthorized fee. In Kuhn v. 
Department of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1995) the Colorado Supreme Court held that a 
claim to recover the payment of an illegal tax accrues when the tax is paid, independently of the 
claimant's knowledge of an injury. Id. at 797. In Paul v. City of Winsoocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.I. 
2000), the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a claim for the payment of an illegal water 
connection impact fee accrued, and the statute of limitations began ticking, as of the date the 
claimant paid the illegal fee because that was the date the claimant suffered an injury. ld. at 171. 
In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of La Habra, 23 P.3d 601 (Cal. 2001), the 
California Supreme Court likewise concluded that in a case to recover ongoing payments for 
utility assessments that arose from an illegal tax, the claim accrued each time the fee was 
collected. Id. at 602. In the case of Venture Coal Sales Company v. Us., 370 FJd 1102 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004), the court ruled that a claim for recovery of payment of an illegal sales tax accrued 
when payment for the sales tax was remitted to the federal government. Id. at 1105. 
These holdings are in line with the views of this Court with regard to the accrual or 
triggering of the statute of limitations. This Court has been more than clear that accrual does not 
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occur until damages are incurred: " ... we have never held that a statute of limitations may run 
before an aggrieved party suffers damages. The authority to do so is highly doubtful, since it is 
axiomatic that a party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs. Corbridge v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88-89, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008-09 (1986). This is further in line 
with the "some damage" standard, which this Court has also applied to the question of accrual 
for a claim under Idaho Code section 5-224. See Jones v. RunJt, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, 
Chtd, 125 Idaho 607 873 P.2d 601 (1994) (applying the "some damage" standard to a claim 
under Idaho Code section 5-224 for breach of a fiduciary duty claim). As with a claim to recover 
the payment of an illegal tax, a party cannot incur "some damage" until it is made to pay the fee 
that is an illegal tax. 
In this case, Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that Valley County's RDA 
scheme is an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax did not accrue until it was required to pay the 
illegal fee. It is not relevant that Buckskin's project involved one conditional use permit. Each 
phase required final plat approval by the Valley County Commissioners. Payment of the illegal 
impact fee was a condition of, and occurred at, final plat approval for each subsequent phase of 
the development. Buckskin suffered no harm or injury, and had no right to seek redress for 
payment of the illegal fee, until each time it paid the illegal fee. Setting the accrual date for an 
illegal fee claim as the date the illegal fee is paid provides a date certain that comports with the 
underlying policy that an injury has not occurred, and a claim has not arisen, until the party 
suffers damages. The arbitrary "made aware of a substantial interference" standard applicable to 
inverse condemnation claims is simply unwarranted in the context of a claim to recover the 
payment of an illegal fee or tax. Aside from the fact that these are distinct claims with distinct 
elements of proof, in the context of an illegal fee/tax claim there is no question as to when the 
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claimant has suffered damages. The illegal fee or tax is paid on a date certain. There is no place 
for an arbitrary standard for accrual when damages arise from a single, specified event. 
Applying the test for accrual for an inverse condemnation claim to an illegal tax claim 
would lead to an absurd result. Passage of an ordinance to collect puts the public on notice of the 
requirements of the ordinance. In the case of an ordinance requiring payment of an unauthorized 
fee or tax, such notice does not mean the offending ordinance is made enforceable against all 
persons who did not bring a lawsuit within the statute of limitations based on the mere passage of 
time. Rather, the offended party must suffer some damage or some harm by being made to pay 
the illegal tax. Otherwise, an ordinance requiring the payment of an unauthorized fee or tax 
becomes, in effect, "legal" after the passage of time simply because nobody sued within the 
limitations period. This cannot be, and is not, the law with regard to the question of when a 
claim to recover payment of an illegal fee or tax accrues. The claim accrues upon the payment 
of the illegal fee or tax because that is when the party paying the illegal fee or tax suffers an 
injury or some damage. 
VI. Did the district court err in refusing to apply the five-year statute of limitations in 
this case to a claim based upon a written instrument? 
Buckskin's claim in Count I of its Complaint is for a declaratory judgment that Valley 
County's RDA's requiring payment of impact fees are illegal contracts and void because Valley 
County uses the agreements to circumvent Idaho law on impact fees. See R. Vol. I, p. 2. The 
Road Development Agreement is a written contract. The applicable statute of limitations for a 
dispute involving a written agreement states that "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be brought: "[w]ithin five (5) years." I.C. § 
5-216. The district court indicated in footnote 1 of its Memorandum Decision that the five year 
statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-216 is inapplicable to Buckskin's claims 
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because there has been no claim for breach of contract and there is no evidence in the record of a 
breach of contract. R. VoL III, p. 491. 
The five-year limitations period under Idaho Code section 5-216 is not limited to breach 
of contract claims. The limitations period applies to any action founded upon an instrument in 
writing. In this case Buckskin sought a declaratory judgment that Valley County cannot 
"circumvent Idaho law by forcing developers to pay momes under the gUIse of a Road 
Development Agreement and/or Capital Contribution Agreement." R. Vol. I, p. 5. The very 
mechanism by which the impact fee was paid was a contract. The UnifOlID Declaratory 
Judgment Act sets no statute of limitation itself. Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations 
for an action founded upon a written instrument applies. See I.C. § 5-201. For this additional 
reason the district court erred in dismissing Buckskin's Complaint. 
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration on this same issue, the district court further 
determined that Buckskin's assertion of the five year statute of limitations was "without merit 
because this is simply not an action based on a contract." R. VoL III, p. 581. As stated directly 
above, it was by way of a written contract that Valley County required the payment of an impact 
fee. If it is determined that Valley County cannot circumvent IDIF A by means of a written 
contract to collect impact fees, all contracts entered into under that scheme are illegal. Hence, 
money collected under that contract in the form of impact fees should be returned to the 
developer. See Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 
P.3d 307, 312 (2002) (Idaho law recognizes rescission as an equitable remedy that totally 
abrogates the contract and seeks to restore the parties to their original position prior to the 
contract). 
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VII. Is Appellant Buckskin entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
Buckskin requests an award of attorney fees on appeal based on Idaho Code Sections 12-
117, and 12-121. 
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides in a judicial proceeding involving a governmental 
entity such as Valley County, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney 
fees if the Court finds that the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The 
purpose of this statute is: (1) to deter arbitrary or groundless action by the government agency; 
and (2) to provide a remedy for financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes made by the 
governmental agency. Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 
P.3d 340, 343 (2004). A party acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law only when the 
party's pursuit of its claims is frivolous, without foundation or unreasonable. Karr v. 
Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444,449, 129 P.3d 88, 93 (2005). Where the requirements of I.C. § 12-
117 are met, an award of attorney fees is mandatory, not discretionary. Rincover v. State of 
Idaho, Dep't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473,475 (1999). 
Likewise, I.e. § 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees only when a claim is pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without merit. I.e. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). However, unlike Idaho Code 12-117 an 
attorney's fees award under section 12-121 is discretionary on the court. Chisholm v. Twin Falls 
County, 139 Idaho 131, 136,75 P.2d 185, 190 (2003). 
In this case, attorney fees on appeal are awardable under I.C. §§ 12-117 and 12-121 
because there is no basis in law for the County to collect impact fees in derogation of IDIFA's 
requirements. The County's LUDO references the ability to collect an impact fee on Planned 
Unit Developments. R. Vol. II, p. 290. Further, the County has already admitted that it has not 
enacted an IDIFA compliant ordinance. R. Vol. I, p. 33. Even Valley County's Master 
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Transportation Plan reveals that the County's program was intended to collect impact fees. 
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. E. These facts taken together should have been enough for the district 
court to order that the offending provisions of the LUDO be stricken and declare that Buckskin 
did not have to pay an impact fee on its final phases of The Meadows. 
If this Court finds that the district court erroneously relied on the County's Resolution 11-
6 to moot Buckskin's request for declaratory relief, then a finding should also be made that the 
County had no basis in law to collect impact fees. Buckskin raised this issue in its Objection to 
Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, as well as its Motion for Reconsideration and 
Memorandum in support of that motion. See R. Vol. III, pp. 510-522. Buckskin also filed its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment CR. Vol. III, p. 494) on Count I of is Complaint because 
the district court recognized that that County could not collect impact fees CR. Vol. III, p. 494). 
Based on its arguments raised on appeal, Buckskin respectfully asks this Court to award attorney 
fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Buckskin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's judgment dismissing Buckskin's Complaint. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 2011. 
EV ANS KEANE LLP 
By y~ r:.~ 
Victor Villegas, fthe FIrm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of November, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by 
fax transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a 
person in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Matthew C. Williams 
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
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